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Abstract
BACKGROUND
Empirical findings regarding the impact of women’s employment on divorce are mixed.
One explanation is that the effects are moderated by the country context. Another is that
previous studies have failed to account for unobserved factors that introduce bias into
the estimated effects. Studies also rarely consider possible anticipatory employment
behavior on the part of women who are thinking of divorce.
OBJECTIVE
The aim of this study is to deepen our understanding of the nexus between women’s
employment and divorce in a comparative perspective.
METHODS
We adopt an analytical strategy that allows us to account for selection and anticipation
mechanisms. Namely, we estimate marital disruption and employment jointly, and
monitor the timing of divorce after employment entry. This approach is implemented
using micro-level data for Germany, Hungary, Italy, and Poland.
RESULTS
We find that women’s employment facilitates marital disruption in Italy and Poland, but
not in Germany and Hungary. We also show that selection effects play out differently in
different contexts. Finally, we notice traces of anticipatory behavior in Italy.
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2 Wittgenstein Centre (IIASA, VID/ÖAW, WU), Vienna Institute of Demography, Austrian Academy of
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CONTRIBUTION
We conclude that women’s employment is less likely to be linked to divorce in
countries with easier access to divorce and in countries with more generous financial
support for families and single mothers, which in turn makes women less reliant on the
market. With this study we hope to encourage future researchers to consider the
potentially distorting effects of selection and anticipation strategies in (comparative)
divorce research.
1. Introduction
Women’s labor force participation has been increasing across all industrialized
economies for at least half a century. Over the same period, rates of marital dissolution
have also risen. In response to these trends, social observers have become increasingly
interested in the effects of women’s social and economic independence on divorce.5 A
first line of research, based upon the dominant male breadwinner/female carer
economic model of the family, has hypothesized that women’s employment represents a
potent force that is driving divorce rates up (see Hobson 1990; Kalmijn and Poortman
2006; Ruggles 1997; Schoen et al. 2002). A second line of research has challenged this
assertion: It has been argued that men’s and women’s social roles have been changing
(Cooke 2004; Sayer and Bianchi 2000; Sigle-Rushton 2010), and that woman’s
earnings can stabilize a marriage by contributing to the family budget (Cherlin 2000;
Oppenheimer 1997; Stevenson and Wolfers 2007).
Empirical findings on these questions are mixed. One possible explanation for this
heterogeneous pattern is that the effects of women’s economic resources on the risk of
divorce are moderated by the country context in which women make life-changing
decisions about work and marriage (e.g., Cooke et al. 2013; van Damme and Kalmijn
2014; Kaplan and Stier 2010; Styrc and Matysiak 2012). Another explanation lies in
individual-level characteristics, often unobserved by researchers, which may
simultaneously affect a woman’s employment and the stability of her marriage; for
example, her level of attachment to family values, her career orientation, or her
psychological traits. A failure to account for these characteristics may bias the
estimated effect of women’s employment on divorce. Finally, previous studies rarely
took into account the possibility that a woman who has become dissatisfied with her
marriage might intensify her efforts in the labor market in anticipation of a divorce
(e.g., Poortman 2005; van Damme and Kalmijn 2014). Studies that do not account for
5 In the following, we use the terms ‘divorce,’ ‘marriage disruption,’ and ‘marriage dissolution’
interchangeably.
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this anticipation mechanism may overestimate the positive effect of women’s
employment on divorce risk.
The goal of this paper is to deepen our understanding of the nexus between
women’s employment and marital instability. We analyze marriage disruption because
marriage represents a union context that can be more easily compared across different
countries than cohabitation. Cohabitation has different meanings in different countries
(Perelli-Harris et al. 2014), and is less coherently acknowledged in different policy
areas (Perelli-Harris and Sánchez Gassen 2012). Our contribution is threefold. First, we
compare countries that differ in terms of their institutional, cultural, and economic
settings; we do so to investigate how specific country contexts shape the relationship
between women’s employment and marital stability. Second, we wash out possible
biases from the presence of unobserved time-constant factors: We do this through the
simultaneous modeling of women’s employment and partnership biographies within a
common maximum likelihood event-history framework. Third, we monitor the
possibility of a woman’s anticipatory entry into the labor market prior to a divorce by
looking at how the effect of women’s employment on divorce changes once she has
entered employment.
To implement our innovative analytical strategy we use harmonized data from the
Generations and Gender Survey (GGS), selecting countries with samples that are large
enough to offer robust and stable estimates at the country level, namely, Germany,
Hungary, Italy, and Poland. These countries differ in several dimensions: norms
regarding women’s employment and parenthood, policies supporting the economically
weaker party in case of a divorce, the degree to which having a second income is an
economic necessity, and divorce diffusion. These differences enabled us to formulate
country-specific expectations about the impact of women’s employment on marital
stability.
2. Women’s employment and divorce
2.1 Theoretical perspectives and empirical evidence
Several theoretical arguments predict a positive relationship between women’s
employment and divorce. The economic model of marriage proposed by Becker,
Landes, and Michael (1977) presupposes that the woman’s entry into the labor market
will lower a couple’s gains from specialization, and will therefore increase tension
within the marriage (see also Becker 1981). Others argue that the labor-market
involvement of both partners may lead to a status competition between husband and
wife (Parsons 1940; Raz-Yurovich 2012) or might be indicative of a husband’s poor
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performance as an income provider (Cherlin 1979; Jalovaara 2003), which might lead
to strains within the couple. Given that employment gives a woman the resources
necessary for ending an unhappy marriage (the so-called independence hypothesis, see
Hobson 1990; Ruggles 1997; Schoen et al. 2002), her entry into employment may
increase the divorce risk.
These arguments have been criticized for relying on a traditional model of the
gendered division of labor. More recently it has been suggested that economic
contributions to the household budget by both partners improve a couple’s living
standard and allow them to be better prepared for a job loss on the part of one of the
two (Cherlin 2000; Härkönen 2013; Oppenheimer 1997; Raz-Yurovich 2012; Sayer and
Bianchi 2000; Stevenson and Wolfers 2007). Furthermore, similarity of activities and
interests allows partners to share their skills, knowledge, and networks (Coltrane 2000;
Sayer and Bianchi 2000; Simpson and England 1981), enhancing the quality of the
marriage (Bernardi 1999; Blossfeld and Drobnic 2001; Özcan and Breen 2012).
The research findings on the effect of women’s employment on divorce are as
ambiguous as the theoretical predictions (Lyngstad and Jalovaara 2010). We posit that
there are at least three reasons for this. First, the opposing theoretical arguments about
the effect of woman’s employment on marital stability are derived from contrasting
assumptions about women’s role in the family. Theories that predict a positive
association between women’s employment and divorce rely on the assumption that
women are the main care providers, and thus women’s entry into the labor market will
lead to strains between the partners. By contrast, theories that anticipate a negative
relationship assume that both partners work for pay and that they divide domestic and
care work. Whether empirical studies find a positive or negative association between
women’s employment and divorce may thus depend on the country context; e.g., on the
extent to which the traditional division of labor is supported by family policies, social
norms dominant in the country, or a country’s economic condition. Furthermore,
empirical findings might be inconsistent due to methodological shortcomings in
previous studies. Past research has rarely considered the unobserved characteristics of
women, which jointly affect women’s employment and divorce decisions and which
confound the observed relationship between the two variables. Meanwhile, researchers
have often failed to account for the fact that women may enter employment to be in a
better position to get divorced.
2.2 The country context
The literature has identified five major context dimensions that can affect the divorce
risks of employed and nonemployed women: norms about men’s and women’s social
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roles (Blossfeld and Müller 2002; Cooke et al. 2013), work-family reconciliation
policies (Blossfeld and Müller 2002; Cooke 2006; Cooke et al. 2013; Cooke and Gash
2010), financial support for single parents (van Damme, Kalmijn, and Uunk 2009;
Kaplan and Stier 2010), the level of men’s earnings relative to family maintenance costs
(e.g., Cherlin 2000; Oppenheimer 1994, 1997; Stevenson and Wolfers 2007), and the
diffusion of divorce in a given society (Goode 1993; Härkönen and Dronkers 2006;
Matysiak, Styrc, and Vignoli 2014).
The normative expectations about men’s and women’s social roles define which
roles men and women should and should not take. In more traditional contexts, where
women are considered to be mainly responsible for domestic tasks and men for
providing income, women’s participation in the labor market may lead to more conflict
and lower satisfaction in a marriage than in egalitarian societies (Carlson et al. 2016).
Women may also receive less support from their male partners in combining paid work
and care than in egalitarian societies, and this may further increase women’s
dissatisfaction with their partner.
The lack of public policies for working parents (such as high-quality, accessible
childcare) may further increase the conflict between paid work and care experienced by
working women, and thus intensify work–family tensions (Neyer 2003; Cooke et al.
2013). Therefore, we might expect stronger marital strains and consequently higher
divorce risks in countries where paid work and childrearing lacks institutional and
cultural support.
The link between women’s employment and marital stability may also be
moderated by government support for single parents. Having access to special forms of
financial assistance or childcare arrangements for single parents weakens a woman’s
dependence on her partner and on the market (Kaplan and Stier 2010).
In addition, in countries where the man’s earnings are often insufficient for
household expenses, the financial contribution of a wife may stabilize a marriage;
whereas this is not necessarily the case in countries where a woman’s income is less
crucial to the household budget (Oppenheimer 1997; Stevenson and Wolfers 2007).
Finally, in countries where divorce was or still is a relatively rare event, marital
disruption is associated with high social and economic costs. Women with more
resources – e.g., with a job or with a higher level of education – may find it easier to get
divorced than women with fewer resources (Goode 1993; Härkönen and Dronkers
2006). When divorce becomes more common in a given society the differentials in
women’s ability to bear the economic and social costs of divorce fade away, and the
positive association between woman’s employment and divorce risk weakens
(Matysiak, Styrc, and Vignoli 2014).
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2.3 Unobserved factors
The second explanation for inconsistent empirical findings may be related to the
inability of researchers to control for women’s characteristics that jointly affect
women’s employment and marriage choices. They may encompass attachment to
family, career orientation, gender role attitudes, and psychological traits that determine
personal success in various life domains. Data on such characteristics is rarely available
and a failure to account for them leads to an estimation bias (see also van Damme and
Kalmijn 2014). The positive effect of women’s employment on divorce risks can, for
example, be overestimated if the women display a high propensity to enter employment
and dissolve a union for unobserved reasons (positive selection); e.g., because they
have a strong career orientation and a low level of attachment to family values. On the
other side, the positive impact of women’s employment on divorce can be
underestimated if the women have a high propensity to exit employment or exit a
marriage for unobserved reasons (negative selection) such as poor health or a ‘risk-
taking’ personality.
2.4 Anticipation mechanisms
Yet another reason why the findings concerning the relationship between women’s
employment and divorce have been inconsistent is that these studies relied on the
observed order of events (e.g., employment entry and divorce). As such, they took for
granted that the divorce decision and the actual divorce happen at the same time. Such a
strategy biases the effect of women’s employment on divorce risk upwards if married
women increase their involvement in the labor market in response to a decline in their
satisfaction with marriage and a fear of marriage disruption (van Damme and Kalmijn
2014; Oppenheimer 1997; Özcan and Breen 2012). Empirical studies have provided
some evidence for such anticipatory adjustments, though these adjustments do not seem
to be strong (Austen 2004; Johnson and Skinner 1986; Papps 2006; Poortman 2005;
Rogers 1999).
3. Country contexts
3.1 Women’s employment
Women in Hungary and Poland became integrated into the labor market in the second
half of the 20th century and are currently much better established as income providers
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than women in Germany and Italy (Figure 1).6 In  the  early  1970s  the  labor  force
participation rate of women of prime working age (25–54) was 78% in Poland and 66%
and growing in Hungary. Even though the collapse of state socialism in the early 1990s
led to labor market turmoil and resulted in a strong decline in employment, in both
countries more than 70% of women remained in the labor force. In West Germany and
Italy,  labor  force  participation  in  the  early  1970s  was  much  lower  (less  than  50%  in
West Germany and less than 30% in Italy) but has been steadily growing since,
especially in Germany.
Figure 1: Labor force participation of women aged 25–54. Germany, Hungary,
Italy, Poland, 1970–2011
Source: Own elaboration based on ILO LABORSTA (up to 2008) and Eurostat data (2009–2011).
Note: For Italy, the 1977–1980 rate is for women aged 25–49.
6 Germany unified in 1990 from two states that had previously had distinct economic and legal arrangements.
The process of unification was accomplished mostly through the incorporation of the former GDR into the
political, legal, and economic system of the FRG. This is the main reason why our description focuses on the
FRG. The second reason is that the population of the FRG was more numerous than the population of the
GDR; hence, the observations referring to the geographical boundaries of the current Germany before 1990
are dominated by the FRG.
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3.2 Reconciliation policies and gender norms
None of the four countries provides good conditions for the reconciliation of paid work
and family life (Matysiak and Węziak-Białowolska 2016). Public support for parents
who  want  to  combine  paid  work  and  family  is  weak  and  the  social  acceptance  of
mothers’ employment is relatively low. Nonetheless, there are some differences across
countries.
Under state socialism, Poland and Hungary adopted the dual-earner/female-
double-burden model. Women were expected to provide both income and care, while
men were free from providing care and domestic chores. Women combined work and
family obligations supported by employment protection laws and childcare services
(Fodor et al. 2002; Pascall and Manning 2000). After Poland and Hungary transitioned
to a market economy both countries sharply reduced family-related expenditures.
Family policy in Hungary remained more generous than in Poland, though it is difficult
to say whether it was more supportive of working parents. On the one hand, the supply
of childcare services in the 1990s and 2000s was better in Hungary than in Poland
(Szelewa 2012; Szikra and Szelewa 2010). On the other hand, Hungary provided more
generous family benefits and parental-leave payments, which was shown to slow down
mothers’ return to work after birth (Matysiak and Szalma 2014). Despite the changes in
public support for combining paid work and care, the social expectations for women
and men have remained unchanged: Women continue to be perceived as the main care
providers, and they are also expected to work for pay (Pascall and Manning 2000). This
situation, in which women receive little support from the state and from their partners
but where they need to work and take primary responsibility for household and
childcare, leads to serious work–family tensions, especially in Poland.
In Germany the welfare system was designed to support the traditional division of
labor. This meant poor childcare provision, high part-time employment of mothers, and
income tax splitting, favoring traditional male breadwinner families (Ostner 1993).
Women were primarily expected to provide care, i.e., to stay at home with very young
children  and  work  only  part-time  when  children  were  at  school  (Treas  and  Widmer
2000). Since the 1990s, however, Germany has been gradually expanding its public
childcare services and in 2007 reformed its parental leave system, offering clear
incentives for men to spend more time with children (Evers, Lewis, and Riedel 2005;
Rosenfeld, Trappe, and Gornick 2004). The reform resulted in an increase in men’s
participation in childcare (Geisler and Kreyenfeld 2012) and coincided with an increase
in the social acceptance of working women (Unterhofer and Wrohlich 2017).
Italian family policies are the least supportive of gender equality. Even though the
country has experienced a strong increase in female labor market participation in the
last decades (Vignoli, Drefahl, and De Santis 2012), public services remain limited for
children aged zero–three and the levels of male participation in domestic chores
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continue to be very low (Anxo et al. 2011; Vignoli 2013). Furthermore, leave for
newborns is short: a mandatory leave of five months for mothers, which can be
extended by six months, and an option of six months leave for fathers, which is rarely
used. In addition, compensation is low (30% of salary). Finally, social acceptance of
women’s employment and an egalitarian division of labor also remains low in Italy
(Matysiak and Węziak-Białowolska 2016; Treas and Widmer 2000).
3.3 State support for single mothers
In all four countries, single mothers receive some financial support from the state.
Depending  on  the  country,  this  support  comes  in  the  form  of  family  benefits,  social
assistance, tax breaks, or social benefits in kind (e.g., housing benefits). Of the four
countries, however, Italy is the only one that offers financial support for single mothers
that is conditional on employment: Nonworking single mothers in Italy do not receive
any financial support from the state. In the remaining countries, support for single
mothers is means-tested and falls with women’s earnings, with the steepest declines
observed in Poland. Public support for nonworking single mothers is most generous in
Germany: 43% of the average national wage, compared to around 30% in Hungary and
Poland (own computation based on OECD 2008; available upon request). However, as
single mothers in Germany, Hungary, and Poland take up employment, state support
falls. For instance, the income of a single mother who earns the average national wage
is topped up by some 14% in Germany and Hungary. Due to strong means testing, no
social support is granted to single mothers in Poland at this pay level.
Forms of alimony, such as child support payments from a nonresident parent,
usually represent the second kind of financial support single parents are entitled to
receive. The share of sole parents receiving child support from the nonresident parent is
highest in Germany and Hungary at nearly 34%, is slightly lower in Poland at nearly
31%, and is lowest in Italy at 22% (OECD 2011).
3.4 The economic necessity of a second income
The four countries studied also differ greatly in terms of affluence, which determines
the extent to which the economic activity of both partners is required for a household’s
needs. Here we examine the percentages of household expenditure spent on ‘basic’
goods, a category that encompasses food and non-alcoholic beverages; housing,
including water, electricity, gas, and other fuels; and clothing and footwear. Our
computations, based on Eurostat data from 2005 and 2010 and available on request,
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show that households in Germany spend the least on basic consumption expenditure
(proportional to their total expenditure), followed by Hungary and Italy. The need for
the second income seems to be highest in Poland, where basic consumption expenditure
constitutes the highest proportion of total household expenditure.7 Consistent with these
findings, Klesment and Van Bavel (2017) find that women in the postsocialist European
countries contribute higher proportions of income to the household budgets than women
in other European countries.
3.5 The democratization of divorce
The  four  countries  also  differ  in  terms  of  the  diffusion  of  divorce.  As  shown  in
Figure 2, divorce has long been commonplace in Hungary and Germany, and both
countries currently have relatively high divorce levels: More than 40% of marriages are
expected to dissolve if the current duration-specific divorce rates hold.8 Poland had
rather stable levels of marital dissolution throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, but
divorce rates in the country have rocketed since the mid–late 1990s. In Italy the marked
increase in marital disruption began after 1980 and accelerated in the 2000s.9 The
higher levels of divorce in Hungary and Germany suggest that in those countries
divorce is less selective than in Italy and Poland, where the incidence of marital
dissolution is lower.
7 Basic consumption expenditure as a proportion of total household expenditure for households with one
working person and households with two working persons amount to 0.46 and 0.43 in Germany, 0.54 and 0.5
in Hungary, 0.56 and 0.51 in Italy and 0.61 and 0.57 in Poland.
8 The sharp fall in divorces at the end of the 1970s is due to the introduction of the new divorce laws in the
former Federal Republic, which made the legal procedure leading to a divorce longer. See: http://www.bib-
demografie.de/EN/Facts_Figures/Divorces/Figures/a_05_06_zusgef_ehescheidungsziffer_d_w_o_ab1970.ht
ml.
9 It is important to note that the total divorce rate is not the best indicator for describing patterns of union
dissolution in Italy, as it downplays the phenomenon. Due to the fact that until 2015 the normative process
toward marital dissolution included a period of ‘separation’ regulated by law, the total separation rate long
illustrated elevated levels of marital disruption. For instance, in 2014 the total separation rate amounted to 319
separations per 1,000 marriages, while the total divorce rate stopped at 183 divorces per 1,000 marriages
(Istat 2016).
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Figure 2: Trends in the total divorce rate in Germany, Hungary, Italy, and
Poland, 1970–2011
Source: Council of Europe Data up to 2004; own calculations on Eurostat data for 2005–2011.
3.6 Research hypotheses
We expect to find that the association between woman’s employment and any divorce
risk will differ depending on the contextual setting of each country. We anticipate that it
will be strongly positive in Italy. This country has only weakly rooted economic
activities for women, a strongly anchored male breadwinner model, unfavorable
conditions for work–family reconciliation, and only very limited support for single
mothers. Conditioning financial support for single mothers on employment status in
Italy may also be a strong driver of mothers taking up work if they expect union
dissolution. Thus, it is likely that an anticipation mechanism contributes to the positive
effect of employment.
Hungary and Poland have high levels of women’s employment that are historically
rooted. In these countries a dual-earner family model is a prerequisite for satisfying the
Vignoli et al.: The positive impact of women’s employment on divorce: Context, selection, or anticipation?
1070 http://www.demographic-research.org
economic needs of family members and financial assistance for single mothers is more
generous than in Italy. Nonetheless, support for combining paid work and care is
relatively weak in these countries. Thus, we might expect the positive association
between woman’s employment and divorce risk to be weaker than in Italy.
Furthermore, there might also be differences between Hungary and Poland in the
impact of women’s employment on divorce, though it would be difficult to establish the
direction of this difference. Hungary has more generous state support for single mothers
and divorce is more widespread and thus less selective of certain socioeconomic
groups. All this would suggest that the association between woman’s employment and
divorce is weaker in Hungary than in Poland. On the other hand, the economic needs of
Polish households seem to be greater, and thus women’s employment may have a more
stabilizing effect on marriages in Poland.
Germany is characterized by high levels of women’s labor force participation, but
the current levels are the result of intensive growth since the 1970s. Many women still
go part-time after becoming mothers and often do not return to full-time employment
until their children enter school, although this has been changing in recent years.
Germany is also characterized by generous support for single mothers and high levels
of divorce, which should weaken the positive effects of women’s employment on
marriage dissolution. On the other hand, women’s employment is less necessary to
cover household expenditure in Germany than in the other three countries.
Consequently, we expect to find that the impact of woman’s employment on divorce in
Germany is positive but rather weak, as in Hungary.
4. Analytical strategy
In order to address our research objectives we have developed an analytical model that
allows us to account for women’s selection and anticipation strategies. First, we present
a multi-process hazard model, which accounts for individual time-constant
unobservables. Second, we extend the model by adding conditional splines of time
since employment entry to the equation (1) to account for anticipation.
Our multi-process hazard model consists of three single-process hazard models
estimated jointly (the subscripts for an individual were suppressed for the sake of
simplicity):
ln ℎ஽ (t) = α0 + α1 DurMar(t) + α2 ZD (t) + α3 XD + α4Emp(t) + εD        (1)
ln ℎாே (t) = γ0 + γ1 DurNonE(t) + γ2 ZEN (t) + γ3 XEN + εEN        (2)
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ln ℎா௑ (t) = δ0 + δ1 DurE(t) + δ2 ZEX (t) + δ3 XEX + εEX        (3)
where hD(t) constitutes the hazard of marriage disruption, hEN(t) the hazard of
employment entry, and hEX(t) the hazard of employment exit, with time t measured in
months. The baseline log hazards are modeled with the use of piecewise linear spline
functions of time (for more details see Lillard 1993).
The process time in equation (1) is the time elapsed since marriage formation until
its disruption (settled at the date of the de facto separation), the death of a partner, or the
time of the interview – whichever occurred first (DurMar(t)). Our main explanatory
variable is a binary indicator of woman’s employment status, Emp(t), and a woman was
classified as being employed if she was either working or was on maternity or parental
leave. We controlled for a series of time-constant XD and time-varying ZD(t) covariates.
Finally, equation (1) contains a random term εD, which is fixed over a woman’s
lifetime. It is assumed to follow a normal distribution with a zero mean and a standard
deviation ߪఌವ, and describes a woman’s unobserved time-invariant proneness to
dissolve a marriage.
Overall, our main interest is the estimate of the effect of a woman’s employment
on her marriage disruption risk; i.e., in parameter α4. However, this parameter might be
biased due to a possible selection of divorce-prone individuals in the employed/
nonemployed pool according to unobserved woman-specific characteristics. In order to
account for the selection, we need to estimate equation (1) jointly with equations (2)
and (3) in a common maximum likelihood framework (see Lillard, Brien, and Waite
1995; Lillard and Panis 1996). The identification of the model is attained through
within-person replication (Lillard, Brien, and Waite 1995: 446). Note that such an
approach only accounts for time-constant unobserved characteristics that are derived
from ‘serial’ behavior over the life course – in this specific context, women who have
had more than one divorce and several employment episodes.
Equations (2) and (3) model the transitions, respectively, to and out of
employment. In equation (2) a woman is observed from age fifteen until her first entry
into employment, and later when she exits a job until she enters another one. Likewise,
in equation (3) a woman is followed from her first entry into a job until her exit from
that job, and later from the point at which she starts a second or subsequent job until she
exits that job. The variables DurNonE(t) and DurE(t) represent the baseline hazards;
i.e., the time since entering nonemployment and employment, respectively. They are
assumed to shift proportionally by a series of time-constant X and time-varying Z(t)
covariates. Both equations also contain woman-specific unobserved heterogeneity
terms, εEN and εEX, which are assumed to be normally distributed (with respectively zero
means and standard deviations ߪఌಶಿ and ߪఌಶ೉) and represent woman-specific, time-
constant, unobserved propensity terms for entering and exiting employment.
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The simultaneous estimation of equations (1)–(3) implies that the woman-specific
unobserved heterogeneity terms are jointly distributed:
       (4)
A positive correlation between the unobserved propensity of women to divorce
and enter employment (ߩ	ఌವఌಶಿ 	> 0) and a negative correlation between the unobserved
propensity of women to divorce and exit employment (ߩ	ఌವఌಶ೉	<  0)  are  signs  of  the
selection of divorce-prone women into the employed pool due to time-constant
unobserved characteristics. Conversely, a negative correlation between the unobserved
propensity of women to divorce and enter employment (ߩ	ఌವఌಶಿ 	< 0) and a positive
correlation between the unobserved propensity of women to divorce and exit
employment (ߩ	ఌವఌಶ೉	> 0) implies that divorce-prone women select themselves for the
nonemployed pool.
This model specification does not, however, account for any possible adjustments
in a woman’s labor market status in anticipation of a divorce, which biases upward the
estimated effect of women’s employment on divorce risk. In order to account for such
adjustments, in the next step we replace the binary variable describing a woman’s
employment status with a conditional spline for the time since her entry into
employment (see also Kulu and Vikat 2007). The spline switches on at employment
entry, and allows us to verify whether and how the risk of marriage disruption changes
over time after a woman has entered employment. There are three possibilities here.
First, if the risk of divorce increases markedly after employment entry and continues to
increase, we can attribute the divorce to increasing tension between partners resulting
from the woman’s entry into the labor market (causation). Second, if the risk of divorce
increases sharply after employment entry and remains elevated and constant from then
on, we can conclude that the positive impact of women’s employment on divorce is not
due to anticipation behavior (causation). Finally, symptoms of anticipatory adjustments
can be detected if the risk of divorce increases abruptly after employment entry and
starts to decline after a relatively short period, when the women who entered
employment in response to an upcoming divorce separate from their husbands.
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5. Data
We  used  data  from  the  GGS  for  Germany,  Hungary,  and  Poland  and  from  the
Multipurpose Household Survey “Family and Social Subjects” (FSS) for Italy. For
Germany and Hungary we used the first two waves of the GGS, which were carried out
in 2004–2005 and 2008–2009 for both countries. We did so because the employment
history of each respondent was only recorded in the second wave. The Italian FSS,
conducted in 2009, was intended to replicate the 2003 Italian GGS. For Poland we used
the first wave of the GGS, which was carried out at the turn of 2010 and 2011 and
which already contained employment history. The overall response rates were 55%
(first wave) and 50% (second wave) for the German GGS, 83% for both waves of the
Hungarian  GGS,  55%  for  the  Polish  GGS,  and  81%  for  the  Italian  FSS.  From  these
datasets we extracted married women who were born in 1955 or later (Table 1).
We considered quite a few potential confounders when estimating the effects in
question. The complete set of time-constant and time-varying controls is listed in the
Table A-1 (Appendix). It is also important to know other factors such as women’s
religiosity or urban versus rural area of residence. However, in GGS surveys these are
only collected at the time of the interview, and their inclusion in the models introduces
the risk of performing an “anticipatory analysis” (Hoem and Kreyenfeld 2006a, 2006b).
Being a retrospective survey, GGS data does not include information on ex-partners.
This means that we cannot include the male partner’s characteristics in the estimation
equation.
Table 1: Analytical sample: Overall samples and subsamples of first and
higher-order marriages, Germany, Hungary, Italy, and Poland
Overall sample
Women who entered
first marriage Second and higher-order marriage
Germany 1,340 1,038 61
Hungary 2,938 2,222 171
Italy 10,586 6,709 143
Poland 6,352 4,731 135
We are aware that it would have been important to distinguish between East and
West Germany in the analysis. However, the German GGS only provides us with
information on the place of residence at the time of the interview. Given the massive
east-to-west migration after the fall of the communist system, we could not use this
information retrospectively.
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6. Empirical findings
Our modeling strategy consisted of three steps. First, we estimated the single-process
hazard models of marriage disruption, entry into employment, and exit from
employment (M1) (namely, equations (1)–(3) modeled separately). Second, we
estimated the multi-process hazard model, which means that we allowed the unobserved
person-specific characteristics to correlate across equations (M2). Third, the
explanatory variable in the regression equation of marital disruption indicating
woman’s employment in model M2 was replaced by a conditional piecewise linear
spline from entry into employment (M3). By comparing the results obtained in the first
and second step we assess to what extent the link between employment and divorce is
affected by the selection. By comparing the results obtained in the second and third
steps we evaluate whether the estimated effect of employment on marital instability
results from a woman’s anticipatory behavior. Full model outcomes are available in
Tables A-2–A-13 (Appendix).
6.1 Selection effects
The estimates of the parameters of the unobserved heterogeneity terms from the multi-
process model M2 are reported in Table 2. The significant estimates of the residuals’
standard deviations indicate that there is considerable variability in the person-specific
unmeasured characteristics in all of the processes under consideration in Hungary, Italy,
and Poland. Few of the correlations between the unobserved heterogeneity terms turned
out to be significant. This means that we were quite successful in selecting the
covariates that control for important antecedents of divorce and employment processes,
both of which influence the two processes. Nonetheless, some correlations between
unobserved heterogeneity terms are shown to be significant. For example, we found that
in Poland the unobserved heterogeneity term of marital disruption correlates positively
with the unobserved heterogeneity term of employment exit. This finding implies that
women with an above-average unobserved propensity to terminate employment also
have an above-average propensity for marital break-up. Thus, in Poland the estimate of
the impact of women’s employment on marital disruption, derived from a standard
single-process model M1, provides us with downwardly biased estimates.
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Table 2: Unobserved heterogeneity terms from regressions of divorce, entry
into employment, and exit from employment: standard deviations
and correlations. Germany, Hungary, Italy, and Poland
Germany   Hungary   Italy   Poland
estimate SE   estimate SE   estimate SE   estimate SE
Standard deviations of unobserved heterogeneity terms
Marital disruption 0.86 0.64 0.60 * 0.34 0.83 ** 0.40 0.81 *** 0.30
Employment entry 1.10 *** 0.07 0.69 *** 0.03 0.91 *** 0.03 0.87 *** 0.03
Employment exit 1.01 *** 0.14 0.62 *** 0.06 0.77 *** 0.04 1.08 *** 0.06
Correlations between unobserved heterogeneity terms
Marital disruption and
employment entry 0.51 0.31 0.01 0.13 0.14 0.10 0.13 0.10
Marital disruption and
employment exit 0.12 0.23 0.17 0.18 0.04 0.10 0.41 *** 0.15
Employment entry and exit –0.43 *** 0.11   –0.03 0.09   0.21 *** 0.06   –0.01 0.05
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
6.2 Impact of women’s employment on divorce
The single-process hazard models yield positive effects of employment on marital
disruption in all countries but Hungary, where the impact is insignificant (Table 3, M1).
The magnitude of the effect appears to be strongest in Italy, where employed women
have a 50% higher risk of marital disruption than nonemployed women. The risk of
divorce for women in employment is 35% higher than for nonemployed women in
Germany and 20% higher in Poland. After the correlation between processes is allowed
for, the positive effect of employment remains significant only in Italy and Poland
(Table 3, M2).
In Germany the previous positive effect of women’s employment on divorce risks
(obtained in M1) becomes insignificant in M2. This is so even though the correlations
between unobserved heterogeneity terms in the processes for divorce and employment
entry/employment exit are insignificant. Nonetheless, the size of the correlation
between the unobserved heterogeneity terms in the processes of divorce and
employment entry is quite large (see Table 2), and its nonsignificance might be
attributable to the scarcity of within-person replications (i.e., second and higher-order
divorces). Hence, a positive selection seems to emerge in Germany: Women with weak
family orientation are also strongly work-oriented. In Italy, the positive impact of
women’s employment on divorce decreases from 1.49 to 1.38. This reduction is in line
with the positive correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity terms for marital
disruption and entry into employment. It suggests the selection of divorce-prone women
into the pool of the employed due to unobserved time-constant characteristics. This
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correlation term, whose size is not negligible (0.14), is, however, not significant; this
might be due, again, to the low number of repeated events. In Poland, meanwhile, the
positive effect of women’s employment on divorce intensifies from over 20% to over
40% after we account for the correlation between employment and union disruption
processes. This change is in line with the results presented in Table 2. These show that
women who are more likely to quit employment are also, for unobserved reasons, more
likely to divorce.
Table 3: Relative risks of the effect of women’s employment on divorce.
Estimates from single-process and multi-process hazard models.
Germany, Hungary, Italy, and Poland
 Single-process model (M1)  Multi-process model (M2)
Indicator of being employed (ref. = not employed)
Germany 1.35 * 1.11
Hungary 1.14 1.16
Italy 1.49 *** 1.38 ***
Poland   1.22 **   1.42 ***
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Estimates are controlled for duration of marriage, age at first
marriage, marriage order, calendar time, number of children, age of the youngest child, educational level, parental divorce, parental
education, cohabitation prior to first marriage, conception/birth prior to first marriage.
6.3 Anticipation effects
Finally, we investigated how the risk of marital disruption is related to time since entry
into employment (M3). The results of the spline estimate are presented in Figure 3. In
Germany and Hungary the risk of marital disruption increases only slightly after
employment entry, and remains insignificant thereafter. This confirms our findings that
women’s employment does not affect marital disruption in those two countries. In
Poland the risk of marital disruption increases strongly after a woman’s entry into
employment, and remains at that level thereafter. This suggests that marital disruption
in Poland is positively related to women’s employment in general, but there are no
signs of anticipatory behavior. Finally, in Italy we found that the risk of marital
disruption increases strongly after a woman enters employment, then decreases with
time. This decline in the risk of marital disruption suggests that some women entered
employment because they feared their union might dissolve. This finding points to the
presence of anticipatory adjustments in Italy, suggesting that the positive effect of
women’s employment on divorce seen in Table 3 is partly driven by anticipation.
Nevertheless, it appears that anticipatory behavior does not explain the overall effect of
employment on marital stability in Italy, as the positive relationship between the two
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processes is still observed several years after a woman has entered employment. Even
ten years after employment entry her risk of divorce is more than 20% higher than that
of a nonemployed woman.
Figure 3: Duration-dependent effect of employment on divorce, estimates from
a multi-process hazard model with time since employment entry in
equation (1) (Model M3). Germany, Hungary, Italy, and Poland
Germany Hungary
Italy Poland
Note: Estimates are controlled for duration of marriage, age at first marriage, marriage order, calendar time, number of children, age
of the youngest child, educational level, parental divorce, parental education, cohabitation prior to first marriage, conception/birth
prior to first marriage.
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7. Conclusions
In this study we investigated the impact of women’s employment on divorce in
Germany, Hungary, Italy, and Poland using a novel solution that accounted for two
potentially interfering elements: first, estimation bias due to women’s unobserved
characteristics, which may jointly affect the two processes; and, second, the anticipatory
employment behavior of women who might expect to divorce in the near future.
Our findings show that women’s employment has a strongly positive effect on
marital disruption in Italy and Poland, and no effect in Germany and Hungary. Today,
Italy is still dominated by male breadwinners, unfavorable conditions for work–family
reconciliation, and relatively low female employment rates. In Poland, the dual earner
family model is much more prevalent than in Italy, but the country continues to be
characterized by a traditional division of unpaid work within couples, and women’s
employment is not sufficiently supported by public policies (Matysiak and Vignoli
2013). State support for single mothers is weak in Poland and rudimentary in Italy. The
elevated divorce risks of employed women in Italy and Poland are thus in line with
traditional microeconomic perspectives. Finally, they are largely consistent with
previous research on the two countries (Liefbroer and Dourleijn 2006; De Rose 1992;
Salvini and Vignoli 2011; Styrc and Matysiak 2012; Vignoli and Ferro 2009), even
though these studies did not consider selection and anticipation mechanisms.
By contrast, in contemporary Hungary and Germany the impact of women’s
employment on divorce appears to be negligible. Despite Hungary’s shared legacy with
Poland, we found no significant impact of women’s employment on divorce for
Hungary. The effect of women’s employment on divorce is not detectable in the
country for a number of reasons. In Hungary, the (full-time) dual-earner family model
has  been dominant  for  over  50  years.  But,  in  contrast  to  Poland,  Hungary  places  less
economic pressure on women to be economically active after divorce because of the
country’s relatively generous financial transfers to families and single mothers. What is
more, the incidence of divorce is quite high. These results are in line with previous
empirical evidence for Hungary (e.g., Liefbroer and Dourleijn 2006; Oláh 2001). Like
Hungary, Germany, where we found no significant effects of women’s employment on
marital disruption, displays relatively high levels of divorce and, again, relatively
generous support for single mothers.
Overall,  the  first  key  result  of  our  study  is  that  there  is  country  variation  in  the
impact of women’s employment on divorce even after accounting for selection and
anticipation mechanisms. Women’s employment is less likely to be linked to divorce in
Germany and Hungary – i.e., in countries with easier access to divorce, where women
from all social strata are more likely to be able to afford a divorce. Likewise, women’s
employment is less likely to be linked to divorce in countries with more generous
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financial support for families and single mothers, which lessen women’s reliance on the
labor market.
The second important contribution of our article is that we showed that the
correlation between employment and marital instability can be affected by selection
mechanisms. The multi-process specification changed the findings for Germany and
Poland and confirmed those for Hungary and Italy. In Germany the slightly significant
higher risk of marital disruption for employed women vanished in the multi-process
variant of the model. Hence, the impact of women’s employment on divorce in
Germany is partly driven by selection effects; e.g., by women who have a weak family
orientation or a low-quality marriage, or who are strongly work-oriented or successful
in the labor market. This may explain why previous studies on the topic generated
conflicting messages for Germany ‒ e.g., Cooke (2006) and Cooke et al. (2013) showed
that the two processes are not significantly related; Liefbroer and Dourleijn (2006)
found a significantly positive association between women’s employment and union
disruption in West Germany, and no significant relationship in East Germany; van
Damme and Kalmijn (2014) illustrated a positive association for both East and West
Germany. The same multi-process specification for Poland yielded estimates that were
negatively biased due to the selection of divorce-prone women who were not in
employment. This finding suggests that in Poland unobserved factors simultaneously
affect the propensity to exit employment and the propensity to exit a marriage. Such
behavior may be reinforced by the structure of financial support available to single
mothers. Poland is fairly generous to nonworking or low-paid single mothers, but
financial assistance is not provided to single mothers with average or higher earnings.
The third key finding is related to the question of whether the positive correlation
between employment and divorce results from the wife’s attempt to secure her own
source of income in anticipation of marital disruption. Similarly to Poortman (2005),
we found little evidence for anticipatory behaviors. Italy was the only country where
some traces of anticipation were found. This is likely attributable to the still low
women’s labor force participation there. A woman facing a high risk of marital
disruption may take up a new labor market activity, as almost all of the state support
available to single mothers is conditional on being employed (through tax breaks or
family reconciliation policies like enhanced access to public childcare). Though we
found a pattern of anticipation behavior in Italy, it is worth noting that this pattern does
not fully explain the elevated levels of disruption risk for employed women, as these
levels remained high even several years after entry into employment.
Our study has its limitations. First, for data-related reasons we focused on only
four countries. Although we cover a wide range of different arrangements for women’s
participation in private and public life, it would have been interesting to include a
country where the conditions for reconciling paid work and family life are good, where
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gender equality in the public and private spheres is high, and where the state support for
single mothers is more generous. We hope that our research strategy will be applied to
these kinds of contexts when suitable data is available. Second, as the surveys we used
do  not  include  information  on  ex-partners,  we  were  unable  to  look  at  couples  in  the
analysis; thus, we could control only for the respondent’s information in predicting
divorce risk. It has, however, been suggested that information on both partners’
contributions to paid and unpaid work are needed to properly assess the impact of
women’s employment on union dissolution (Mencarini and Vignoli 2017; Oláh and
Gähler 2014; Sigle-Rushton 2010). Third, it is possible to argue that group-specific
differences matter: For instance, selection and anticipation mechanisms may play an
even larger role among younger cohorts, in more recent time periods, or among certain
social classes. Due to the sample’s limitations – we had a limited number of marriages
and divorces of second and higher orders – we could not explore these possibilities
using our data because of model convergence failures. Fourth, controlling for women’s
time-constant unobserved characteristics is a substantial improvement over the
conventional event-history applications. However, our estimates may still be biased by
selection effects due to time-varying unmeasured factors, as women might change their
attitude  toward  paid  work  and  family  life  over  their  life  course.  Next,  our  method  of
controlling for anticipatory behavior does not take into account the possibility that
women who are already employed may try harder to remain employed if they expect to
divorce. If we could also account for anticipatory adjustments of this kind we might
find signs of anticipatory behaviors in other countries with more widespread female
employment than Italy. Finally, based on our findings we are not able to disentangle the
mechanisms behind the positive effects of women’s employment on divorce in Italy and
Poland. This positive effect can be driven by tensions between partners that arise when
both spouses spend a considerable amount of time outside the home, in particular if
there are small children. In addition, employment may also give women resources to
dissolve unhappy marriages that they would not otherwise have. It would be interesting
to investigate in future research which of these mechanisms, if any, is responsible for
our findings.
Our study has yielded new results for Germany, Hungary, Italy, and Poland that
are both robust and coherent. We conclude that the country context is essential for
filtering the impact of women’s employment on divorce. We have shown that common
unobserved antecedents influence both women’s employment and divorce risks that
induce selection mechanisms, and that these mechanisms may operate differently in
different contexts. In addition, we found that women’s anticipatory employment
adjustments are country-specific. Removing these biases is crucial for generating valid
and meaningful comparisons. Hence, with this study we hope to encourage future
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researchers to consider the potentially distorting effects of selection and of anticipation
strategies, especially when different contextual settings are compared.
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Appendix
Table A-1: Time-constant and time-varying covariates of the equations for the
transition to marital disruption, to employment entry, and to
employment exit
Marital disruption Employment entry Employment exit
Time-varying covariates (spline specification)
Duration of marriage X
Duration of nonemployment X
Duration of employment X
Age X X
Calendar time X X X
Age of the youngest child X X X
Time-varying covariates (categorical)
Number of children X X X
Marriage order X
Educational level X X X
Employment X
Order of nonemployment spell X
Marital status X X
Work experience X X
Order of employment spell X
Time-constant covariates
Parental divorce X
Parental education X X X
Age at first marriage X
Cohabitation prior to first marriage X
Conception/birth prior to first marriage X
Mother’s employment X X
Note: In Model M3 the indicator of being employed is substituted by a conditional spline for the time since entry into employment.
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Table A-2: Parameter estimates for marital disruption, Germany
Single-process
model
Multi-process model
with indicator of
being employed
Multi-process model
with duration
dependence since
entry into
employment
(Model M1) (Model M2) (Model M3)
Explanatory variables Coeff. SE   Coeff. SE   Coeff. SE
Intercept –4.04 * 2.18 –3.69 2.49 –3.71 2.52
Duration of marriage
0–2 years (slope) 0.64 * 0.33 0.66 * 0.36 0.66 * 0.37
2–4 years (slope) –0.01 0.23 0.00 0.24 0.01 0.24
4–7 years (slope) –0.17 0.13 –0.15 0.14 –0.15 0.14
7–10 years (slope) 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.12
>10 years (slope) –0.05 0.04 –0.04 0.04 –0.04 0.04
Calendar time
1971–1979 (slope) –0.13 0.26 –0.17 0.30 –0.16 0.30
1980–1989 (slope) –0.03 0.05 –0.03 0.06 –0.04 0.06
1990–1999 (slope) 0.08 ** 0.03 0.08 ** 0.04 0.08 ** 0.04
2000–2004 (slope) –0.05 0.06 –0.05 0.07 –0.05 0.07
2005–2011 (slope) 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.11 0.04 0.11
Age of the youngest child (duration since conception)
Pregnancy: 0–9 months (slope) 1.17 1.30 1.19 1.41 1.18 1.44
Child aged 0–3 years (slope) 0.24 0.15 0.23 0.16 0.23 0.16
Child aged 3–7 years (slope) 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.09
Child over 7 years old (slope) –0.01 0.04 –0.01 0.04 –0.01 0.04
Number of children (ref. = no children)
One –2.10 ** 0.87 –2.19 ** 0.97 –2.21 ** 0.99
Two –0.20 0.21 –0.24 0.23 –0.25 0.24
Three or more –0.14 0.27 –0.16 0.30 –0.16 0.30
Parental divorce (ref. = no divorce)
Yes 0.33 0.35 0.34 0.39 0.35 0.40
Parental education (ref. = no parent with higher education)
At least one parent with tertiary education –0.04 0.22 –0.07 0.25 –0.07 0.26
Age at first marriage (ref. = 19 years or younger)
20–23 years –0.39 0.26 –0.44 0.30 –0.46 0.31
24–27 years –0.56 * 0.30 –0.57 * 0.34 –0.60 * 0.35
28 or more years –1.01 ** 0.39 –1.04 ** 0.44 –1.09 ** 0.46
Marriage order (ref. = first marriage)
Higher order marriage 0.12 0.81 –0.17 0.82 –0.27 0.82
Conception/birth prior to first marriage (ref. = no conception prior to marriage)
First conception prior to first marriage 0.38 * 0.22 0.39 0.26 0.40 0.26
First birth prior to first marriage 0.68 ** 0.26 0.72 ** 0.29 0.73 ** 0.30
Cohabitation prior to first marriage (ref. = no)
Yes 0.53 ** 0.21 0.54 ** 0.23 0.55 ** 0.24
Educational level (ref. = tertiary)
Secondary 0.01 0.23 –0.08 0.26 –0.08 0.27
Vocational/primary –0.17 0.33 –0.31 0.40 –0.33 0.42
In education 0.49 0.33 0.17 0.38 0.16 0.39
Indicator of being employed (ref. = no)
Yes 0.30 * 0.17 0.10 0.24
Duration since entry into employment
Entry into employment (intercept) 0.06 0.28
Change over time (slope)   0.01 0.02
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Table A-3: Parameter estimates for marital disruption, Hungary
Single-process
model
Multi-process model
with indicator of
being employed
Multi-process model
with duration
dependence since
entry into
employment
(Model M1) (Model M2) (Model M3)
Explanatory variable Coeff. SE   Coeff. SE   Coeff. SE
Intercept –4.25 *** 0.89 –4.29 *** 0.92 –4.28 *** 0.92
Duration of marriage
0–2 years (slope) 1.02 *** 0.20 1.02 *** 0.21 1.02 *** 0.21
2–4 years (slope) –0.15 0.12 –0.15 0.13 –0.16 0.13
4–7 years (slope) 0.14 * 0.08 0.14 * 0.08 0.14 * 0.08
7–10 years (slope) –0.04 0.07 –0.04 0.07 –0.04 0.07
>10 years (slope) –0.01 0.02 –0.01 0.02 –0.01 0.02
Calendar time
1971–1979 (slope) –0.12 0.10 –0.12 0.10 –0.12 0.10
1980–1989 (slope) –0.01 0.03 –0.01 0.03 –0.01 0.03
1990–1999 (slope) 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02
2000–2004 (slope) –0.05 0.04 –0.05 0.04 –0.05 0.04
2005–2011 (slope) 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.06
Age of the youngest child (duration since conception)
Pregnancy: 0–9 months (slope) 0.94 0.67 0.93 0.68 0.93 0.68
Child aged 0–3 years (slope) 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.09
Child aged 3–7 years (slope) 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.05
Child over 7 years old (slope) –0.02 0.02 –0.02 0.02 –0.02 0.02
Number of children (ref. = no children)
One –1.69 *** 0.44 –1.70 *** 0.45 –1.70 *** 0.46
Two –0.65 *** 0.13 –0.64 *** 0.13 –0.65 *** 0.13
Three or more –0.72 *** 0.19 –0.73 *** 0.19 –0.73 *** 0.19
Parental divorce (ref. = no divorce)
Yes 0.48 *** 0.14 0.47 *** 0.14 0.47 *** 0.14
Parental education (ref. = no parent with higher education)
At least one parent with tertiary education 0.40 *** 0.15 0.41 *** 0.15 0.41 *** 0.15
Age at first marriage (ref. = 19 years or younger)
20–23 years –0.26 ** 0.12 –0.24 ** 0.12 –0.24 ** 0.12
24–27 years –0.54 *** 0.17 –0.53 *** 0.17 –0.53 *** 0.18
28 or more years –0.92 *** 0.27 –0.91 *** 0.27 –0.91 *** 0.27
Marriage order (ref. = first marriage)
Higher order marriage 0.52 * 0.30 0.53 * 0.30 0.53 * 0.30
Conception/birth prior to first marriage (ref. = no conception prior to marriage)
First conception prior to first marriage 0.25 ** 0.12 0.25 ** 0.12 0.25 ** 0.12
First birth prior to first marriage 0.60 *** 0.22 0.59 *** 0.22 0.59 *** 0.22
Cohabitation prior to first marriage (ref. = no)
Yes 0.68 *** 0.13 0.67 *** 0.13 0.67 *** 0.13
Educational level (ref. = tertiary)
Secondary –0.15 0.14 –0.11 0.15 –0.11 0.15
Vocational/primary –0.18 0.18 –0.13 0.18 –0.14 0.19
In education 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.18
Indicator of being employed (ref. = no)
Yes 0.13 0.12 0.15 0.14
Duration since entry into employment
Entry into employment (intercept) 0.14 0.15
Change over time (slope)   0.00 0.01
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Table A-4: Parameter estimates for marital disruption, Italy
Single-process
model
Multi-process model
with indicator of
being employed
Multi-process model
with duration
dependence since
entry into
employment
(Model M1) (Model M2) (Model M3)
Explanatory variable Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Intercept –3.34 *** 0.97   –3.39 *** 0.98   –3.38 *** 0.99
Duration of marriage
0–2 years (slope) –0.40 *** 0.10 –0.39 *** 0.10 –0.39 *** 0.10
2–4 years (slope) 0.11 0 0.10 0.11 0 0.10 0.12 0 0.10
4–7 years (slope) –0.01 0 0.06 0.00 0 0.07 0.01 0 0.07
7–10 years (slope) 0.01 0 0.06 0.01 0 0.06 0.02 0 0.06
>10 years (slope) –0.06 *** 0.02 –0.06 *** 0.02 –0.05 *** 0.02
Calendar time
1971–1979 (slope) –0.10 0 0.11 –0.09 0 0.11 –0.10 0 0.11
1980–1989 (slope) 0.06 ** 0.02 0.06 ** 0.02 0.06 ** 0.02
1990–1999 (slope) 0.05 *** 0.01 0.05 *** 0.02 0.05 *** 0.02
2000–2004 (slope) –0.05 0 0.03 –0.04 0 0.03 –0.05 0 0.03
2005–2011 (slope) 0.01 0 0.04 0.01 0 0.04 0.01 0 0.04
Age of the youngest child (duration since conception)
Pregnancy: 0–9 months (slope) 0.52 0 0.44 0.50 0 0.44 0.51 0 0.44
Child aged 0–3 years (slope) –0.08 0 0.06 –0.08 0 0.06 –0.09 0 0.06
Child aged 3–7 years (slope) –0.01 0 0.04 –0.01 0 0.04 –0.01 0 0.04
Child over 7 years old (slope) –0.02 0 0.02 –0.02 0 0.02 –0.02 0 0.02
Number of children (ref. = no children)
One –0.84 *** 0.29 –0.83 *** 0.29 –0.83 *** 0.29
Two –0.41 *** 0.11 –0.41 *** 0.11 –0.42 *** 0.11
Three or more –0.38 ** 0.17 –0.39 ** 0.17 –0.43 ** 0.18
Parental divorce (ref. = no divorce)
Yes 0.80 *** 0.15 0.81 *** 0.16 0.80 *** 0.16
Parental education (ref. = no parent with higher education)
At least one parent with tertiary education 0.58 *** 0.16 0.58 *** 0.17 0.57 *** 0.17
Age at first marriage (ref. = 19 years or younger)
20–23 years –0.21 0 0.14 –0.21 0 0.14 –0.19 0 0.14
24–27 years –0.65 *** 0.16 –0.65 *** 0.16 –0.60 *** 0.16
28 or more years –0.96 *** 0.18 –0.94 *** 0.19 –0.85 *** 0.19
Marriage order (ref. = first marriage)
Higher order marriage –0.59 0 0.55 –0.69 0 0.57 –0.55 0 0.57
Conception/birth prior to first marriage (ref. = no conception prior to marriage)
First conception prior to first marriage 0.57 *** 0.11 0.58 *** 0.11 0.57 *** 0.11
First birth prior to first marriage 0.71 *** 0.16 0.71 *** 0.17 0.71 *** 0.17
Cohabitation prior to first marriage (ref. = no)
Yes 0.31 *** 0.12 0.30 ** 0.12 0.30 ** 0.12
Educational level (ref. = tertiary)
Secondary –0.16 0 0.13 –0.18 0 0.13 –0.15 0 0.13
Vocational –0.25 0 0.16 –0.27 0 0.17 –0.24 0 0.17
Primary –0.42 *** 0.14 –0.46 *** 0.15 –0.44 *** 0.15
In education 0.34 0 0.21 0.31 0 0.22 0.32 0 0.22
Indicator of being employed (ref. = no)
Yes 0.40 *** 0.08 0.32 *** 0.10
Duration since entry into employment
Entry into employment (intercept) 0.43 *** 0.11
Change over time (slope) –0.02 ** 0.01
Demographic Research: Volume 38, Article 37
http://www.demographic-research.org 1093
Table A-5: Parameter estimates for marital disruption, Poland
Single-process
model
Multi-process model
with indicator of
being employed
Multi-process model
with duration
dependence since
entry into
employment
(Model M1) (Model M2) (Model M3)
Explanatory variable Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Intercept –6.36 ** 2.00   –6.51 *** 2.18   –6.51 *** 2.47
Duration of marriage
0–2 years (slope) 0.32 * 0.18 0.32 * 0.18 0.32 * 0.18
2–4 years (slope) 0.24 ** 0.12 0.25 ** 0.12 0.25 ** 0.12
4–7 years (slope) –0.13 * 0.07 –0.13 * 0.07 –0.13 * 0.07
7–10 years (slope) 0.13 ** 0.06 0.14 ** 0.06 0.14 ** 0.06
>10 years (slope) –0.03 ** 0.02 –0.03 ** 0.02 –0.03 * 0.02
Calendar time
1971–1979 (slope) 0.13 0 0.23 0.11 0 0.25 0.11 0 0.28
1980–1989 (slope) –0.01 0 0.04 –0.01 0 0.04 –0.01 0 0.04
1990–1999 (slope) –0.14 * 0.08 –0.13 * 0.08 –0.13 * 0.08
2000–2004 (slope) 0.10 ** 0.01 0.10 *** 0.01 0.10 *** 0.01
2005–2011 (slope) –0.06 ** 0.03 –0.05 * 0.03 –0.05 * 0.03
Age of the youngest child (duration since conception)
Pregnancy: 0–9 months (slope) 1.79 ** 0.75 1.80 ** 0.76 1.80 ** 0.77
Child aged 0–3 years (slope) 0.02 0 0.07 0.01 0 0.08 0.01 0 0.08
Child aged 3–7 years (slope) 0.10 ** 0.04 0.09 ** 0.04 0.09 ** 0.04
Child over 7 years old (slope) –0.05 ** 0.02 –0.05 *** 0.02 –0.05 *** 0.02
Number of children (ref. = no children)
One –1.71 ** 0.53 –1.70 *** 0.54 –1.70 *** 0.54
Two –0.47 ** 0.11 –0.49 *** 0.11 0.34 *** 0.11
Three or more –0.72 ** 0.16 –0.72 *** 0.17 –0.49 *** 0.11
Parental divorce (ref. = no divorce)
Yes 0.67 ** 0.12 0.64 *** 0.13 0.64 *** 0.13
Parents never lived together 0.11 0.37  0.11 0 0.39  0.11 0 0.39
Parental education (ref. = no parent with higher education)
At least one parent with tertiary education 0.50 ** 0.14 0.51 *** 0.15 0.51 *** 0.15
Age at first marriage (ref. = 19 years or younger)
20–23 years –0.45 ** 0.11 –0.46 *** 0.12 –0.46 *** 0.12
24–27 years –0.66 ** 0.14 –0.68 *** 0.15 –0.68 *** 0.15
28 or more years –0.74 ** 0.19 –0.78 *** 0.20 –0.78 *** 0.21
Marriage order (ref. = first marriage)
Higher order marriage 0.31 0 0.37 0.02 0 0.35 0.01 0 0.36
Conception/birth prior to first marriage (ref. = no conception prior to marriage)
First conception prior to first marriage 0.19 ** 0.10 0.18 * 0.10 0.18 * 0.10
First birth prior to first marriage 0.67 ** 0.16 0.67 *** 0.16 0.67 *** 0.16
Cohabitation prior to first marriage (ref. = no)
Yes 0.36 ** 0.10 0.34 *** 0.11 0.34 *** 0.11
Educational level (ref. = tertiary)
Secondary –0.15 0 0.12 –0.14 0 0.12 –0.14 0 0.12
Vocational –0.27 ** 0.14 –0.27 * 0.15 –0.27 * 0.15
Primary 0.06 0 0.17 0.12 0 0.18 0.12 0 0.18
In education 0.08 0 0.18 0.05 0 0.19 0.05 0 0.19
Indicator of being employed (ref. = no)
Yes 0.20 ** 0.09 0.35 *** 0.12
Duration since entry into employment
Entry into employment (intercept) 0.35 *** 0.12
Change over time (slope) 0.00 0.01
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Table A-6: Parameter estimates for employment entry, Germany
Single-process
model
Multi-process model
with indicator of
being employed
Multi-process model
with duration
dependence since
entry into
employment
(Model M1) (Model M2) (Model M3)
Explanatory variable Coeff. SE   Coeff. SE   Coeff. SE
Intercept 1.20 *** 0.44 1.37 *** 0.47 1.36 *** 0.47
Time since entering nonemployment
0–0.5 years (slope) –2.63 *** 0.40 –2.58 *** 0.44 –2.58 *** 0.44
0.5–1 years (slope) 0.24 0.33 0.23 0.35 0.23 0.35
1–3 years (slope) 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.07
3–5 years (slope) 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
>5 years (slope) –0.01 0.01 –0.01 0.01 –0.01 0.01
Age
15–19 years (slope) 0.20 *** 0.04 0.20 *** 0.04 0.20 *** 0.04
20–24 years (slope) –0.05 * 0.03 –0.05 * 0.03 –0.05 * 0.03
25–29 years (slope) 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03
30–39 years (slope) –0.02 0.02 –0.02 0.02 –0.02 0.02
40–44 years (slope) 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.05
45 or more years (slope) –0.17 *** 0.06 –0.16 ** 0.07 –0.17 ** 0.07
Calendar time
1970–1989 (slope) –0.02 ** 0.01 –0.02 ** 0.01 –0.02 ** 0.01
1990–1993 (slope) –0.12 *** 0.03 –0.12 *** 0.03 –0.12 *** 0.03
1994–1997 (slope) 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04
1998–2003 (slope) 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
2004–2007 (slope) –0.08 * 0.04 –0.08 * 0.05 –0.08 * 0.05
2008–2011 (slope) 0.20 0.23 0.20 0.24 0.19 0.24
Age of the youngest child (duration since conception)
Pregnancy 0–6 months (slope) –0.15 0.71 –0.15 0.78 –0.15 0.79
Pregnancy 6 months–child aged 6 months (slope) –0.08 0.34 –0.08 0.36 –0.08 0.37
Child aged 6 months–3 years (slope) 0.45 *** 0.08 0.45 *** 0.08 0.45 *** 0.08
Child aged 3–5 years (slope) –0.12 0.08 –0.12 0.08 –0.12 0.08
Child aged over 5 years (slope) 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02
Number of children (ref. = no children)
One –1.35 *** 0.23 –1.36 *** 0.26 –1.36 *** 0.26
Two –0.19 ** 0.09 –0.19 ** 0.10 –0.20 ** 0.10
Three or more –0.41 *** 0.13 –0.45 *** 0.13 –0.44 *** 0.13
Mother’s employment (ref. = no)
Yes 0.04 0.42 –0.08 0.44 –0.09 0.44
Parental education (ref. = no parent with higher education)
At least one parent with tertiary education –0.13 0.11 –0.14 0.11 –0.15 0.11
Order of nonemployment spell (ref. = first)
Second –0.40 0.40 –0.39 0.43 –0.40 0.43
Third –0.39 0.41 –0.23 0.44 –0.25 0.44
Fourth or next –1.01 ** 0.42 –0.75 0.47 –0.76 0.46
Marital status (ref. = married)
Single 0.63 *** 0.08 0.62 *** 0.09 0.63 *** 0.09
Divorced 0.50 *** 0.12 0.31 ** 0.14
Divorce (intercept) 0.74 *** 0.23
Duration since divorce (slope) –0.09 *** 0.03
Widowed / / / / / /
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Table A-6: (Continued)
Single-process
model
Multi-process model
with indicator of
being employed
Multi-process model
with duration
dependence since
entry into
employment
(Model M1) (Model M2) (Model M3)
Explanatory variable Coeff. SE   Coeff. SE   Coeff. SE
Educational level (ref. = tertiary)
Secondary –0.70 *** 0.09 –0.74 *** 0.10 –0.74 *** 0.10
Vocational/primary –2.17 *** 0.14 –2.22 *** 0.15 –2.21 *** 0.15
In education –3.82 *** 0.10 –3.88 *** 0.11 –3.87 *** 0.11
Work experience (ref. = none)
0–3 years –0.21 0.40 –0.04 0.43 –0.01 0.43
3–6 years –0.50 0.40 –0.42 0.44 –0.40 0.44
6–10 years –0.48 0.41 –0.45 0.45 –0.43 0.45
10 years or more –0.50 0.44   –0.53 0.48   –0.50 0.48
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Table A-7: Parameter estimates for employment entry, Hungary
Single-process
model
Multi-process model
with indicator of being
employed
Multi-process model
with duration
dependence since
entry into employment
(Model M1) (Model M2) (Model M3)
Explanatory variables Coeff. SE   Coeff. SE   Coeff. SE
Intercept –1.21 *** 0.11 –1.30 *** 0.12 –1.30 *** 0.12
Time since entering nonemployment
0–0.5 years (slope) –2.86 *** 0.14 –2.85 *** 0.17 –2.84 *** 0.17
0.5–1 years (slope) 0.44 *** 0.14 0.44 *** 0.16 0.44 *** 0.16
1–3 years (slope) 0.27 *** 0.03 0.27 *** 0.03 0.27 *** 0.03
3–5 years (slope) –0.28 *** 0.03 –0.28 *** 0.03 –0.28 *** 0.03
>5 years (slope) 0.03 *** 0.01 0.03 *** 0.01 0.03 *** 0.01
Age
15–19 years (slope) 0.10 *** 0.02 0.09 *** 0.02 0.10 *** 0.02
20–24 years (slope) –0.12 *** 0.01 –0.12 *** 0.02 –0.12 *** 0.02
25–29 years (slope) –0.08 *** 0.02 –0.07 *** 0.02 –0.07 *** 0.02
30–39 years (slope) 0.04 *** 0.01 0.04 *** 0.01 0.04 *** 0.01
40–44 years (slope) –0.18 *** 0.02 –0.18 *** 0.03 –0.18 *** 0.03
45 or more years (slope) 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Calendar time
1970–1989 (slope) 0.15 *** 0.01 0.15 *** 0.01 0.15 *** 0.01
1990–1993 (slope) –0.22 *** 0.02 –0.22 *** 0.02 –0.22 *** 0.02
1994–1997 (slope) 0.04 * 0.02 0.04 * 0.02 0.04 * 0.02
1998–2003 (slope) 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
2004–2007 (slope) –0.02 0.02 –0.01 0.02 –0.01 0.02
2008–2011 (slope) –1.86 *** 0.24 –1.86 *** 0.25 –1.86 *** 0.25
Age of the youngest child (duration since conception)
Pregnancy 0–6 months (slope) 0.68 *** 0.23 0.67 *** 0.24 0.67 *** 0.24
Pregnancy 6 months–child aged 6 months (slope) –1.39 *** 0.17 –1.39 *** 0.17 –1.39 *** 0.17
Child aged 6 months–3 years (slope) –0.06 0.05 –0.06 0.05 –0.06 0.05
Child aged 3–5 years (slope) –0.09 ** 0.05 –0.10 ** 0.05 –0.10 ** 0.05
Child aged over 5 years (slope) –0.03 *** 0.01 –0.03 *** 0.01 –0.03 *** 0.01
Number of children (ref. = no children)
One 0.49 *** 0.08 0.48 *** 0.08 0.48 *** 0.08
Two –0.20 *** 0.05 –0.20 *** 0.05 –0.20 *** 0.05
Three or more –0.43 *** 0.07 –0.44 *** 0.07 –0.45 *** 0.07
Mother’s employment (ref. = no)
Yes 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Parental education (ref. = no parent with higher education)
At least one parent with tertiary education –0.24 *** 0.07 –0.22 *** 0.07 –0.22 *** 0.07
Order of nonemployment spell (ref. = first)
Second –0.42 *** 0.16 –0.44 *** 0.17 –0.44 *** 0.17
Third –0.14 0.16 –0.15 0.17 –0.16 0.17
Fourth or next –0.15 0.17 –0.17 0.18 –0.17 0.18
Marital status (ref. = married)
Single –0.04 0.05 –0.04 0.05 –0.04 0.05
Divorced –0.15 ** 0.07 –0.15 * 0.08
Divorce (intercept) –0.05 0.11
Duration since divorce (slope) –0.02 0.01
Widowed –0.57 *** 0.14 –0.56 *** 0.15 –0.57 *** 0.15
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Table A-7: (Continued)
Single-process
model
Multi-process model
with indicator of being
employed
Multi-process model
with duration
dependence since
entry into employment
(Model M1) (Model M2) (Model M3)
Explanatory variable Coeff. SE   Coeff. SE   Coeff. SE
Educational level (ref. = tertiary)
Secondary –0.62 *** 0.05 –0.56 *** 0.05 –0.56 *** 0.05
Vocational/primary –1.52 *** 0.07 –1.47 *** 0.07 –1.47 *** 0.07
In education –2.30 *** 0.06 –2.25 *** 0.06 –2.26 *** 0.06
Work experience (ref. = none)
0–3 years 1.15 *** 0.16 1.17 *** 0.17 1.17 *** 0.17
3–6 years 1.46 *** 0.17 1.47 *** 0.18 1.47 *** 0.18
6–10 years 1.57 *** 0.18 1.56 *** 0.18 1.56 *** 0.18
10 years or more 1.44 *** 0.19 1.41 *** 0.19 1.41 *** 0.20
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Table A-8: Parameter estimates for employment entry, Italy
Single-process
model
Multi-process model
with indicator of being
employed
Multi-process model
with duration
dependence since
entry into employment
(Model M1) (Model M2) (Model M3)
Explanatory variable Coeff. SE   Coeff. SE   Coeff. SE
Intercept –1.95 *** 0.09   –1.96 *** 0.09   –1.96 *** 0.09
Time since entering nonemployment
0–0.5 years (slope) –1.04 *** 0.09 –1.06 *** 0.10 –1.06 *** 0.10
0.5–1 years (slope) –0.88 *** 0.09 –0.87 *** 0.09 –0.87 *** 0.09
1–3 years (slope) –0.44 *** 0.03 –0.44 *** 0.03 –0.44 *** 0.03
3–5 years (slope) –0.10 *** 0.02 –0.11 *** 0.02 –0.11 *** 0.02
>5 years (slope) –0.05 *** 0.00 –0.05 *** 0.00 –0.05 *** 0.00
Age
15–19 years (slope) 0.60 *** 0.02 0.61 *** 0.02 0.60 *** 0.02
20–24 years (slope) 0.06 *** 0.01 0.07 *** 0.01 0.07 *** 0.01
25–29 years (slope) 0.06 *** 0.01 0.07 *** 0.01 0.07 *** 0.01
30–39 years (slope) 0.01 ** 0.01 0.02 ** 0.01 0.02 ** 0.01
40–44 years (slope) –0.03 ** 0.02 –0.03 * 0.02 –0.03 * 0.02
45 or more years (slope) –0.09 *** 0.02 –0.09 *** 0.02 –0.09 *** 0.02
Calendar time
1970–1989 (slope) –0.03 *** 0.00 –0.03 *** 0.00 –0.03 *** 0.00
1990–1993 (slope) –0.06 *** 0.01 –0.06 *** 0.01 –0.06 *** 0.01
1994–1997 (slope) 0.08 *** 0.01 0.08 *** 0.01 0.08 *** 0.01
1998–1903 (slope) 0.01 0 0.01 0.01 0 0.01 0.01 0 0.01
2004–2007 (slope) 0.05 *** 0.01 0.05 *** 0.01 0.05 *** 0.01
2008–2011 (slope) –0.24 *** 0.03 –0.24 *** 0.04 –0.24 *** 0.04
Age of the youngest child (duration since conception)
Pregnancy 0–6 months (slope) –1.69 *** 0.44 –1.68 *** 0.44 –1.69 *** 0.44
Pregnancy 6 months–child aged 6 months (slope) 1.01 *** 0.17 1.01 *** 0.17 1.01 *** 0.17
Child aged 6 months–3 years (slope) 0.22 *** 0.03 0.22 *** 0.03 0.22 *** 0.03
Child aged 3–5 years (slope) 0.01 0 0.03 0.01 0 0.03 0.01 0 0.03
Child aged over 5 years (slope) 0.02 *** 0.01 0.01 ** 0.01 0.01 ** 0.01
Number of children (ref. = no children)
One –0.84 *** 0.16 –0.83 *** 0.16 –0.84 *** 0.16
Two –0.22 *** 0.04 –0.22 *** 0.04 –0.21 *** 0.04
Three or more –0.43 *** 0.06 –0.43 *** 0.07 –0.43 *** 0.07
Mother’s employment (ref. = no)
Yes 0.36 *** 0.03 0.37 *** 0.03 0.37 *** 0.03
Parental education (ref. = no parent with higher education)
At least one parent with tertiary education –0.41 *** 0.07 –0.42 *** 0.07 –0.42 *** 0.07
Order of nonemployment spell (ref. = first)
Second –0.80 *** 0.07 –0.83 *** 0.07 –0.83 *** 0.07
Third –0.77 *** 0.08 –0.85 *** 0.08 –0.85 *** 0.08
Fourth or next –0.83 *** 0.09 –0.96 *** 0.09 –0.97 *** 0.09
Marital status (ref. = married)
Single 0.41 *** 0.03 0.42 *** 0.04 0.41 *** 0.04
Divorced 0.73 *** 0.06 0.68 *** 0.07
Divorce (intercept) 0.62 *** 0.08
Duration since divorce (slope) 0.01 0 0.01
Widowed 0.15 0 0.12 0.15 0 0.12 0.16 0 0.12
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Table A-8: (Continued)
Single-process
model
Multi-process model
with indicator of being
employed
Multi-process model
with duration
dependence since
entry into employment
(Model M1) (Model M2) (Model M3)
Explanatory variable Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Educational level (ref. = tertiary)
Secondary –0.24 *** 0.04 –0.24 *** 0.04 –0.24 *** 0.04
Vocational –0.18 *** 0.05 –0.17 *** 0.06 –0.17 *** 0.06
Primary –1.02 *** 0.04 –1.02 *** 0.05 –1.02 *** 0.05
In education –1.69 *** 0.04 –1.69 *** 0.04 –1.69 *** 0.04
Work experience (ref. = none)
0–3 years 0.84 *** 0.07 0.77 *** 0.07 0.77 *** 0.07
3–6 years 0.51 *** 0.07 0.46 *** 0.07 0.46 *** 0.07
6–10 years 0.36 *** 0.08 0.31 *** 0.08 0.31 *** 0.08
10 years or more 0.12 0 0.09   0.08 0 0.09   0.08 0 0.09
Vignoli et al.: The positive impact of women’s employment on divorce: Context, selection, or anticipation?
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Table A-9: Parameter estimates for employment entry, Poland
Single-process
model
Multi-process model
with indicator of being
employed
Multi-process model
with duration
dependence since
entry into employment
(Model M1) (Model M2) (Model M3)
Explanatory variable Coeff. SE   Coeff. SE   Coeff. SE
Intercept –2.81 *** 0.12   –2.81 *** 0.13   –2.81 *** 0.13
Time since entering nonemployment
0–0.5 years (slope) 1.34 *** 0.18 1.34 *** 0.19 1.34 *** 0.19
0.5–1 years (slope) –1.34 *** 0.12 –1.34 *** 0.12 –1.34 *** 0.12
1–3 years (slope) –0.16 *** 0.03 –0.16 *** 0.03 –0.16 *** 0.03
3–5 years (slope) –0.18 *** 0.02 –0.18 *** 0.02 –0.18 *** 0.02
>5 years (slope) –0.06 *** 0.01 –0.06 *** 0.01 –0.06 *** 0.01
Age
15–19 years (slope) 1.01 *** 0.02 1.01 *** 0.02 1.01 *** 0.02
20–24 years (slope) 0.19 *** 0.01 0.19 *** 0.02 0.19 *** 0.02
25–29 years (slope) –0.05 *** 0.01 –0.05 *** 0.01 –0.05 *** 0.01
30–39 years (slope) 0.07 *** 0.01 0.07 *** 0.01 0.07 *** 0.01
40–44 years (slope) –0.09 *** 0.02 –0.09 *** 0.02 –0.09 *** 0.02
45 or more years (slope) –0.10 *** 0.02 –0.10 *** 0.02 –0.10 *** 0.02
Calendar time
1970–1989 (slope) –0.02 *** 0.00 –0.02 *** 0.00 –0.02 *** 0.00
1990–1993 (slope) –0.12 *** 0.02 –0.12 *** 0.02 –0.12 *** 0.02
1994–1997 (slope) 0.01 0 0.02 0.01 0 0.02 0.01 0 0.02
1998–1903 (slope) –0.04 *** 0.01 –0.04 *** 0.01 –0.04 *** 0.01
2004–1907 (slope) 0.17 *** 0.01 0.17 *** 0.01 0.17 *** 0.01
2008–1911 (slope) –0.07 *** 0.02 –0.07 *** 0.02 –0.07 *** 0.02
Age of the youngest child (duration since conception)
Pregnancy 0–6 months (slope) –1.54 *** 0.36 –1.54 *** 0.36 –1.54 *** 0.36
Pregnancy 6 months–child aged 6 months (slope) –0.07 0 0.15 –0.07 0 0.15 –0.07 0 0.15
Child aged 6 months–3 years (slope) 0.31 *** 0.03 0.31 *** 0.03 0.31 *** 0.03
Child aged 3–5 years (slope) 0.09 *** 0.03 0.09 *** 0.03 0.09 *** 0.03
Child aged over 5 years (slope) 0.01 ** 0.01 0.01 ** 0.01 0.01 ** 0.01
Number of children (ref. = no children)
One –0.41 *** 0.12 –0.41 *** 0.12 –0.41 *** 0.12
Two –0.29 *** 0.04 –0.29 *** 0.04 –0.29 *** 0.04
Three or more –0.49 *** 0.06 –0.50 *** 0.06 –0.50 *** 0.06
Mother’s employment (ref. = no)
Yes 0.15 *** 0.04 0.15 *** 0.04 0.15 *** 0.04
Parental education (ref. = no parent with higher education)
At least one parent with tertiary education –0.29 *** 0.06 –0.29 *** 0.06 –0.29 *** 0.06
Order of nonemployment spell (ref. = first)
Second –0.57 *** 0.13 –0.58 *** 0.13 –0.58 *** 0.13
Third –0.69 *** 0.14 –0.70 *** 0.14 –0.70 *** 0.14
Fourth or next –0.96 *** 0.15 –0.96 *** 0.15 –0.95 *** 0.15
Marital status (ref. = married)
Single 0.15 *** 0.05 0.14 *** 0.05 0.15 *** 0.05
Divorced 0.26 *** 0.08 0.21 ** 0.09
Divorce (intercept) 0.26 ** 0.11
Duration since divorce (slope) –0.01 0 0.01
Widowed 0.02 0 0.14 0.01 0 0.14 0.01 0 0.14
Cohabiting 0.00 0 0.05 0.00 0 0.05 0.00 0 0.05
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Table A-9: (Continued)
Single-process
model
Multi-process model
with indicator of being
employed
Multi-process model
with duration
dependence since
entry into employment
(Model M1) (Model M2) (Model M3)
Explanatory variable Coeff. SE   Coeff. SE   Coeff. SE
Educational level (ref. = tertiary)
Secondary –0.57 *** 0.05 –0.57 *** 0.05 –0.57 *** 0.05
Vocational –0.89 *** 0.05 –0.89 *** 0.06 –0.89 *** 0.06
Primary –1.59 *** 0.07 –1.59 *** 0.07 –1.59 *** 0.07
In education –2.17 *** 0.05 –2.17 *** 0.05 –2.17 *** 0.05
Work experience (ref. = none)
0–3 years –0.49 *** 0.13 –0.49 *** 0.13 –0.49 *** 0.13
3–6 years –1.04 *** 0.14 –1.05 *** 0.14 –1.05 *** 0.14
6–10 years –1.32 *** 0.15 –1.34 *** 0.15 –1.34 *** 0.15
10 years or more –1.79 *** 0.16   –1.81 *** 0.17   –1.81 *** 0.17
Vignoli et al.: The positive impact of women’s employment on divorce: Context, selection, or anticipation?
1102 http://www.demographic-research.org
Table A-10: Parameter estimates for employment exit, Germany
Single-process
model
Multi-process model
with indicator of
being employed
Multi-process model
with duration
dependence since
entry into
employment
(Model M1) (Model M2) (Model M3)
Explanatory variable Coeff. SE   Coeff. SE   Coeff. SE
Intercept –5.07 *** 0.67 –4.93 *** 0.74 –4.91 *** 0.74
Time since entering employment
0–0.5 years (slope) 3.47 *** 1.04 3.42 *** 1.14 3.41 *** 1.14
0.5–1 years (slope) 0.34 0.34 0.36 0.37 0.36 0.37
1–3 years (slope) 0.13 * 0.07 0.13 * 0.08 0.13 * 0.08
3–5 years (slope) –0.29 *** 0.07 –0.28 *** 0.08 –0.28 *** 0.08
> 5 years (slope) –0.05 *** 0.02 –0.05 *** 0.02 –0.05 *** 0.02
Age
15–19 years (slope) –0.07 0.10 –0.07 0.10 –0.07 0.10
20–24 years (slope) –0.09 ** 0.04 –0.12 *** 0.04 –0.12 *** 0.04
25–29 years (slope) –0.04 0.03 –0.08 ** 0.04 –0.07 ** 0.04
30–39 years (slope) –0.07 *** 0.02 –0.10 *** 0.02 –0.10 *** 0.02
40–44 years (slope) –0.06 0.05 –0.08 0.05 –0.08 0.06
45 or more years (slope) –0.09 0.06 –0.12 * 0.07 –0.12 * 0.07
Calendar time
1970–1989 (slope) 0.05 *** 0.02 0.05 *** 0.02 0.05 *** 0.02
1990–1993 (slope) 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04
1994–1997 (slope) 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.04
1998–1903 (slope) 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
2004–1907 (slope) 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.06
2008–1911 (slope) 0.23 0.27 0.23 0.27 0.23 0.27
Age of the youngest child (duration since conception)
Pregnancy 0–6 months (slope) 5.81 *** 0.47 5.81 *** 0.50 5.81 *** 0.50
Pregnancy 6 months–child aged 6 months (slope) –2.83 *** 0.25 –2.85 *** 0.26 –2.85 *** 0.27
Child aged 6 months–3 years (slope) –0.27 *** 0.10 –0.26 ** 0.10 –0.26 ** 0.10
Child aged 3–5 years (slope) 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.11
Child aged over 5 years (slope) –0.01 0.02 –0.01 0.02 –0.01 0.02
Number of children (ref. = no children)
One –0.16 0.22 –0.16 0.23 –0.16 0.23
Two –0.42 *** 0.11 –0.41 *** 0.12 –0.41 *** 0.12
Three or more –0.27 * 0.15 –0.24 0.17 –0.24 0.17
Mother’s employment (ref. = no)
Yes –0.45 0.37 –0.41 0.41 –0.41 0.41
Parental education (ref. = no parent with higher education)
At least one parent with tertiary education 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
Order of employment spell (ref. = first)
Second –0.33 0.20 –0.09 0.22 –0.08 0.22
Third –0.64 ** 0.31 –0.27 0.33 –0.25 0.33
Fourth or next –0.90 ** 0.40 –0.41 0.44 –0.39 0.45
Marital status (ref. = married)
Single –0.11 0.10 –0.13 0.10 –0.13 0.10
Divorced 0.24 0.16 0.15 0.21
Divorce (intercept) 0.06 0.27
Duration since divorce (slope) 0.02 0.04
Widowed / / / / / /
Demographic Research: Volume 38, Article 37
http://www.demographic-research.org 1103
Table A-10: (Continued)
Single-process
model
Multi-process model
with indicator of
being employed
Multi-process model
with duration
dependence since
entry into
employment
(Model M1) (Model M2) (Model M3)
Explanatory variable Coeff. SE   Coeff. SE   Coeff. SE
Educational level (ref. = tertiary)
Secondary 0.24 * 0.13 0.24 * 0.14 0.24 * 0.14
Vocational/primary 0.58 *** 0.18 0.64 *** 0.19 0.63 *** 0.19
In education 0.91 *** 0.16 1.01 *** 0.17 1.01 *** 0.17
Work experience (ref. = none)
0–3 years (slope) 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.09
3–6 years (slope) 0.18 *** 0.06 0.20 *** 0.07 0.20 *** 0.07
6–10 years (slope) 0.08 * 0.04 0.09 ** 0.04 0.09 ** 0.04
10 years or more (slope) 0.07 *** 0.03   0.09 *** 0.03   0.09 *** 0.03
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Table A-11: Parameter estimates for employment exit, Hungary
Single-process
model
Multi-process model
with indicator of
being employed
Multi-process model
with duration
dependence since
entry into
employment
(Model M1) (Model M2) (Model M3)
Explanatory variable Coeff. SE   Coeff. SE   Coeff. SE
Intercept –5.07 *** 0.30 –5.04 *** 0.32 –5.03 *** 0.32
Time since entering employment
0–0.5 years (slope) 3.30 *** 0.48 3.31 *** 0.50 3.31 *** 0.50
0.5–1 years (slope) 0.10 0.17 0.09 0.18 0.10 0.18
1–3 years (slope) 0.41 *** 0.04 0.41 *** 0.04 0.41 *** 0.04
3–5 years (slope) –0.30 *** 0.03 –0.31 *** 0.03 –0.30 *** 0.03
>5 years (slope) –0.02 ** 0.01 –0.02 ** 0.01 –0.02 ** 0.01
Age
15–19 years (slope) –0.07 0.06 –0.07 0.06 –0.07 0.06
20–24 years (slope) –0.09 *** 0.02 –0.09 *** 0.02 –0.09 *** 0.02
25–29 years (slope) –0.04 ** 0.02 –0.04 ** 0.02 –0.04 ** 0.02
30–39 years (slope) –0.01 0.01 –0.01 0.01 –0.01 0.01
40–44 years (slope) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
45 or more years (slope) 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02
Calendar time
1970–1989 (slope) 0.05 *** 0.01 0.05 *** 0.01 0.05 *** 0.01
1990–1993 (slope) 0.04 ** 0.02 0.04 * 0.02 0.04 * 0.02
1994–1997 (slope) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
1998–2003 (slope) 0.04 *** 0.01 0.04 *** 0.01 0.04 *** 0.01
2004–2007 (slope) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
2008–2011 (slope) 1.74 *** 0.11 1.74 *** 0.11 1.74 *** 0.11
Age of the youngest child (duration since conception)
Pregnancy 0–6 months (slope) 5.13 *** 0.30 5.13 *** 0.31 5.13 *** 0.31
Pregnancy 6 months–child aged 6months (slope) –4.07 *** 0.16 –4.07 *** 0.16 –4.07 *** 0.16
Child aged 6 months–3 years (slope) 1.10 *** 0.04 1.10 *** 0.04 1.10 *** 0.04
Child aged 3–5 years (slope) –0.99 *** 0.04 –0.99 *** 0.04 –0.99 *** 0.04
Child aged over 5 years (slope) 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
Number of children (ref. = no children)
One –0.31 ** 0.13 –0.31 ** 0.14 –0.31 ** 0.14
Two –0.28 *** 0.06 –0.28 *** 0.06 –0.28 *** 0.06
Three or more –0.24 *** 0.08 –0.24 *** 0.08 –0.24 *** 0.08
Mother’s employment (ref. = no)
Yes 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Parental education (ref. = no parent with higher education)
At least one parent with tertiary education –0.02 0.07 –0.02 0.07 –0.02 0.07
Order of employment spell (ref. = first)
Second 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.08
Third 0.05 0.12 0.06 0.13 0.06 0.13
Fourth or next 0.08 0.17 0.08 0.18 0.09 0.19
Marital status (ref. = married)
Single –0.03 0.06 –0.04 0.06 –0.04 0.06
Divorced 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.08
Divorce (intercept) –0.08 0.11
Duration since divorce (slope) 0.01 0.01
Widowed 0.08 0.13 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.14
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Table A-11: (Continued)
Single-process
model
Multi-process model
with indicator of
being employed
Multi-process model
with duration
dependence since
entry into
employment
(Model M1) (Model M2) (Model M3)
Explanatory variable Coeff. SE   Coeff. SE   Coeff. SE
Educational level (ref. = tertiary)
Secondary 0.34 *** 0.06 0.32 *** 0.06 0.32 *** 0.06
Vocational/primary 0.58 *** 0.08 0.57 *** 0.08 0.57 *** 0.08
In education 0.42 *** 0.07 0.41 *** 0.07 0.41 *** 0.07
Work experience (ref. = none)
0–3 years (slope) –0.33 *** 0.04 –0.33 *** 0.04 –0.33 *** 0.04
3–6 years (slope) 0.11 *** 0.03 0.12 *** 0.03 0.12 *** 0.03
6–10 years (slope) 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02
10 years or more (slope) 0.00 0.01   0.00 0.01   0.00 0.01
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Table A-12: Parameter estimates for employment exit, Italy
Single-process model
Multi-process model
with indicator of
being employed
Multi-process model
with duration
dependence since
entry into
employment
(Model M1) (Model M2) (Model M3)
Explanatory variable Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Intercept –2.88 *** 0.12   –2.96 *** 0.13   –2.97 *** 0.09
Time since entering employment
0–0.5 years (slope) 0.85 *** 0.12 0.85 *** 0.13 0.85 *** 0.10
0.5–1 years (slope) –1.14 *** 0.09 –1.14 *** 0.09 –1.14 *** 0.09
1–3 years (slope) –0.06 ** 0.03 –0.06 ** 0.03 –0.06 *** 0.03
3–5 years (slope) –0.02 0 0.03 –0.02 0 0.03 –0.02 *** 0.02
> 5 years (slope) –0.01 ** 0.01 –0.01 ** 0.01 –0.01 *** 0.00
Age
15–19 years (slope) 0.13 *** 0.02 0.13 *** 0.02 0.13 *** 0.02
20–24 years (slope) –0.07 *** 0.01 –0.05 *** 0.01 –0.05 *** 0.01
25–29 years (slope) –0.05 *** 0.01 –0.04 *** 0.01 –0.04 *** 0.01
30–39 years (slope) –0.09 *** 0.01 –0.08 *** 0.01 –0.08 ** 0.01
40–44 years (slope) –0.05 *** 0.02 –0.04 ** 0.02 –0.04 * 0.02
45 or more years (slope) –0.05 *** 0.02 –0.04 ** 0.02 –0.04 *** 0.02
Calendar time
1970–1989 (slope) 0.02 *** 0.00 0.02 *** 0.00 0.02 *** 0.00
1990–1993 (slope) 0.02 0 0.01 0.02 0 0.01 0.02 *** 0.01
1994–1997 (slope) 0.05 *** 0.01 0.05 *** 0.01 0.05 *** 0.01
1998–2003 (slope) 0.02 * 0.01 0.02 * 0.01 0.02 0 0.01
2004–2007 (slope) 0.08 *** 0.01 0.08 *** 0.01 0.08 *** 0.01
2008–2011 (slope) –0.07 * 0.04 –0.07 * 0.04 –0.07 *** 0.04
Age of the youngest child (duration since conception)
Pregnancy 0–6 months (slope) 1.95 *** 0.28 1.95 *** 0.28 1.95 *** 0.44
Pregnancy 6 months–child aged 6 months (slope) –0.85 *** 0.11 –0.86 *** 0.11 –0.86 *** 0.17
Child aged 6 months–3 years (slope) –0.25 *** 0.04 –0.25 *** 0.04 –0.25 *** 0.03
Child aged 3–5 years (slope) 0.12 *** 0.04 0.12 *** 0.04 0.12 0 0.03
Child aged over 5 years (slope) 0.01 ** 0.01 0.01 ** 0.01 0.01 ** 0.01
Number of children (ref. = no children)
One 0.10 0 0.12 0.10 0 0.12 0.10 *** 0.16
Two 0.01 0 0.04 –0.01 0 0.04 –0.01 *** 0.04
Three or more 0.14 ** 0.07 0.11 0 0.07 0.10 *** 0.06
Mother’s employment (ref. = no)
Yes –0.02 0 0.03 0.01 0 0.03 0.01 *** 0.08
Parental education (ref. = no parent with higher education)
At least one parent with tertiary education 0.07 0 0.06 0.04 0 0.06 0.04 *** 0.04
Order of employment spell (ref. = first)
Second 0.21 *** 0.05 0.15 *** 0.05 0.15 *** 0.07
Third 0.19 ** 0.08 0.09 0 0.08 0.09 *** 0.04
Fourth or next 0.23 ** 0.11 0.10 0 0.12 0.09 0 0.12
Marital status (ref. = married)
Single 0.10 *** 0.04 0.11 *** 0.04 0.11 *** 0.05
Divorced 0.17 *** 0.05 0.17 *** 0.06
Divorce (intercept) 0.23 *** 0.08
Duration since divorce (slope) 0.00 0 0.01
Widowed 0.41 ** 0.18 0.41 ** 0.19 0.40 *** 0.04
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Table A-12: (Continued)
Single-process model
Multi-process model
with indicator of
being employed
Multi-process model
with duration
dependence since
entry into
employment
(Model M1) (Model M2) (Model M3)
Explanatory variable Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Educational level (ref. = tertiary)
Secondary –0.11 ** 0.04 –0.11 ** 0.05 –0.11 *** 0.07
Vocational 0.08 0 0.06 0.10 0 0.06 0.10 *** 0.07
Primary 0.24 *** 0.05 0.23 *** 0.05 0.23 *** 0.08
In education 0.58 *** 0.05 0.56 *** 0.05 0.56 0 0.09
Work experience (ref. = none)
0–3 years (slope) –0.13 *** 0.03 –0.13 *** 0.03 –0.13 *** 0.03
3–6 years (slope) –0.06 *** 0.02 –0.07 *** 0.02 –0.07 *** 0.14
6–10 years (slope) 0.03 ** 0.01 0.02 0 0.01 0.02 *** 0.07
10 years or more (slope) 0.01 0 0.01   0.00 0 0.01   0.00 *** 0.07
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Table A-13: Parameter estimates for employment exit, Poland
Single-process model
Multi-process model
with indicator of
being employed
Multi-process model
with duration
dependence since
entry into
employment
(Model M1) (Model M2) (Model M3)
Explanatory variable Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Intercept –7.09 *** 0.28   –7.07 *** 0.28   –7.07 *** 0.28
Time since entering employment
0–0.5 years (slope) 1.93 *** 0.21 1.94 *** 0.21 1.94 *** 0.21
0.5–1 years (slope) –0.68 *** 0.12 –0.68 *** 0.13 –0.68 *** 0.13
1–3 years (slope) –0.11 *** 0.04 –0.11 *** 0.04 –0.11 *** 0.04
3–5 years (slope) –0.13 *** 0.03 –0.13 *** 0.04 –0.13 *** 0.04
>5 years (slope) –0.02 *** 0.01 –0.02 *** 0.01 –0.02 *** 0.01
Age
15–19 years (slope) 0.29 *** 0.06 0.29 *** 0.06 0.29 *** 0.06
20–24 years (slope) –0.12 *** 0.02 –0.12 *** 0.02 –0.12 *** 0.02
25–29 years (slope) –0.07 *** 0.01 –0.07 *** 0.02 –0.07 *** 0.02
30–39 years (slope) –0.07 *** 0.01 –0.07 *** 0.01 –0.07 *** 0.01
40–44 years (slope) –0.04 ** 0.02 –0.04 ** 0.02 –0.04 ** 0.02
45 or more years (slope) 0.03 * 0.02 0.03 0 0.02 0.03 0 0.02
Calendar time
1970–1989 (slope) 0.10 *** 0.01 0.10 *** 0.01 0.10 *** 0.01
1990–1993 (slope) 0.15 *** 0.02 0.15 *** 0.02 0.15 *** 0.02
1994–1997 (slope) 0.04 ** 0.02 0.04 ** 0.02 0.04 ** 0.02
1998–2003 (slope) 0.04 *** 0.01 0.04 *** 0.01 0.04 *** 0.01
2004–2007 (slope) 0.06 *** 0.02 0.06 *** 0.02 0.06 *** 0.02
2008–2011 (slope) 0.21 *** 0.03 0.21 *** 0.03 0.21 *** 0.03
Age of the youngest child (duration since conception)
Pregnancy 0–6 months (slope) 1.06 *** 0.35 1.06 *** 0.35 1.06 *** 0.35
Pregnancy 6 months–child aged 6 months (slope) –0.47 *** 0.14 –0.47 *** 0.14 –0.47 *** 0.14
Child aged 6 months–3 years (slope) 0.16 *** 0.03 0.16 *** 0.03 0.16 *** 0.03
Child aged 3–5 years (slope) –0.19 *** 0.03 –0.19 *** 0.04 –0.19 *** 0.04
Child aged over 5 years (slope) –0.01 0 0.01 –0.01 0 0.01 –0.01 0 0.01
Number of children (ref. = no children)
One –0.14 0 0.13 –0.14 0 0.13 –0.14 0 0.13
Two 0.08 * 0.05 0.08 * 0.05 0.08 * 0.05
Three or more 0.06 0 0.07 0.07 0 0.07 0.07 0 0.07
Mother’s employment (ref. = no)
Yes –0.09 0 0.05 –0.09 0 0.05 –0.09 0 0.05
Parental education (ref. = no parent with higher education)
At least one parent with tertiary education –0.01 0 0.08 0.00 0 0.08 0.00 0 0.08
Order of employment spell (ref. = first)
Second –0.30 *** 0.08 –0.28 *** 0.09 –0.28 *** 0.09
Third –0.44 *** 0.13 –0.42 *** 0.14 –0.42 *** 0.14
Fourth or next –0.76 *** 0.16 –0.74 *** 0.18 –0.74 *** 0.18
Marital status (ref. = married)
Single 0.22 *** 0.07 0.21 *** 0.07 0.22 *** 0.07
Divorced 0.29 *** 0.09 0.10 0 0.10
Divorce (intercept) 0.12 0 0.11
Duration since divorce (slope) 0.00 0 0.01
Widowed 0.29 ** 0.13 0.29 ** 0.13 0.29 ** 0.13
Cohabiting 0.12 * 0.06 0.12 * 0.06 0.12 * 0.06
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Table A-13: (Continued)
Single-process model
Multi-process model
with indicator of
being employed
Multi-process model
with duration
dependence since
entry into
employment
(Model M1) (Model M2) (Model M3)
Explanatory variable Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Educational level (ref. = tertiary)
Secondary 0.58 *** 0.06 0.57 *** 0.06 0.57 *** 0.06
Vocational 0.91 *** 0.07 0.91 *** 0.07 0.91 *** 0.07
Primary 1.37 *** 0.10 1.37 *** 0.10 1.37 *** 0.10
In education 0.76 *** 0.06 0.76 *** 0.07 0.76 *** 0.07
Work experience (ref. = none)
0–3 years (slope) 0.03 0 0.04 0.03 0 0.04 0.03 0 0.04
3–6 years (slope) 0.05 * 0.03 0.05 * 0.03 0.05 * 0.03
6–10 years (slope) 0.04 ** 0.02 0.05 ** 0.02 0.05 ** 0.02
10 years or more (slope) 0.03 *** 0.01   0.03 *** 0.01   0.03 *** 0.01
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